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COMMENTS
the commercial world, then different courts must apply the same
rules to the settlement of disputes. Section 1-105 would not give
us the certainty, uniformity, and predictability that is a necessity
in the commercial world.
JACK C. CALDWELL
ROBERT T. JORDAN
GEORGE W. PUGH*
ADDITION TO THE FOREGOING NOTE
On August 20, 1949, the scholars interested in conflicts law,
including leading specialists, who met in Ann Arbor for a discus-
sion of world law problems, expressed their unanimous concern
about Section 1-105 of the proposed Commercial Code. They re-
solved on the motion of Professor Elliott E. Cheatham as fol-
lows:
"Resolved, that the undersigned, participants in the 1949
Institute of International and Comparative Law, Ann Arbor,
Michigan, are of the opinion that Section 1-105 (in both forms)
of the May, 1949, draft of the Uniform Commercial Code, dealing
with conflicts of laws, is unwise and should be omitted from the
Code; and the Executive Secretary of the Institute of Interna-
tional and Comparative Law is requested to transmit a copy of
this resolution to the President of the American Law Institute
and the Chairman of the Commissioners on Uniform Laws."
In the minds of those who signed there was not the slightest
doubt that the new work was badly disfigured by this crude
extension of the code to transactions subject to other legal sys-
tems under any existing conflicts theory. If some particularized
demonstration is needed, the foregoing students' note furnishes
illustration. The editors of this Review have requested my own
opinion, which cannot be more than a strictly personal comment
on the implications, not discussed at the Ann Arbor meeting, of
the resolution printed above.
The meeting voted simply for cancellation at the time being,
manifestly because of the considerable efforts necessary for estab-
lishing appropriate rules. Now, in my personal view and as far
as I can see, two different sets of rules of application should be
created.
On one hand, regular rules of conflict must be found, really
deserving the epithets, reasonable and not arbitrary. They may
* Graduate of February, 1950; presently Instructor in Law, Louisiana
State University.
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serve in foreign relations as well as in internal relations not
specially excepted, quite as at present American courts have
conflicts rules, in principle equal for internal and external con-
flicts. While in matters of foreign commerce, of course, Congress
has power to legislate, it should not now start to exercise this
power contrary to international decency and reciprocal respect, if
not even to international law. With respect to internal relations,
it must be remembered that the code expressly includes the rela-
tions of "non-merchants," which is incompatible with the limita-
tion of federal legislation to interstate commerce. The several
states, therefore, have exclusive legislative control not only over
intrastate commerce but also over non-commercial interstate rela-
tions. In all these matters, neither Congress nor any state has the
power to issue such rules as Section 1-105 seeks to promulgate.
On the other hand, it is quite right that Congress may and
should impose a uniform law on all states of the Union for the
purpose of interstate commerce. But it would not be helpful to
say this in one word as the draft proposes, increasing the uncer-
tainty by including any transaction that "affects interstate com-
merce." The draft should define the transactions considered
"interstate" and considered "commercial." This is a new problem
to be solved with careful consideration of the several kinds of
transactions regulated by the code, of past experiences in federal
legal matters, and of constitutional practice.
In all these respects, solutions can be found if only the con-
flicts rules be drawn from realistic observation rather than the
usual schematic formulas. One rule is not enough for the vast
scope of the code; indeed, for some of the topics several rules will
be requisite. Having gone through the special sources of obliga-
tions in the search for adequate rules of conflicts, I gladly find
my personal results confirmed by the most recent draft of the
Bank Collection Part of Article 3, of October, 1949, Section 3-636,
which smoothly sets aside the entire Section 1-105 and subjects
the liability of the bank to the law of the place of the bank, or its
branch or separate office. I am also happy to see how this partial
draft plainly declares the principle of party autonomy (Section
3-601; Section 3-636, Comment 3), overriding Section 1-105 (2)
and Section 1-108.
Practical rules of application can be found indeed. But they
need discussion and some agreement. Because in conflicts debates
a communis opinio doctorum is so frequently frustrated by more
opinions than there are doctors, progress may be arduous. Never-
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theless, this massive and enormously important work calls for
continued efforts in this and other respects. The American Law
Institute has announced further revision of Section 1-105 for
January, 1950. It may be that by the time these remarks are
published they will be obsolete. I hope so.
ERNST RABEL*
AGREEMENTS IN ADVANCE CONFERRING EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION ON FOREIGN COURTS
With almost boring unanimity American courts have refused
to enforce contractual provisions conferring exclusive jurisdic-
tion in advance on a court or courts of a particular sister state
or. foreign country. Leading writers in the fields of conflict of
laws,' admiralty,2 and contracts8 take it to be well settled that
contractual exclusion of the jurisdiction of the courts of a cer-
tain state or country will not-be honored by the courts so sought
to be excluded. The rule is rigidly applied, and hardly ever are
the particular facts involved in a case given consideration.
The rule had its origin in the tendency long displayed by
judges to guard jealously the jurisdiction of their own courts.
This tendency found expression, among others, in the early emas-
culation by the English courts of arbitration clauses by holding
them to be "revocable" at the option of either party.4 Consequent-
ly, it is somewhat surprising to find that English courts from an
early date have enforced contractual clauses conferring exclusive
jurisdiction on foreign tribunals.
In the earliest case on record5 the litigants were foreigners.
A ship and cargo were confiscated in an English port on its voy-
age back to The Netherlands. Dutch seamen sued their Dutch
captain for wages due under a contract entered into in Rotterdam.
The seamen's contract provided that all disputes should be set-
*Research Associate, University of Michigan, Formerly Professor of
Law at the University of Berlin, Director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute
for Foreign and International Private Law, and judge in International
courts.
1. Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (1937) 244.
2. Benedict, Admiralty (Kanuth's 6 ed. 1940) 38.
3. Williston, Contracts (1936) § 1725.
4. Vynior's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 80a (1609); Kell v. Hillister, K.B. 1 Wilson
129 (1746); Wellington v. Macintosh, 2 Atk. 569 (Ch. 1743). However, the
position taken was legislatively overruled by the enactment of the Arbitra-
tion Act of 1889. 52 and 53 Vict. c. 49.
5. Gienar v. Meyer, 2 H.Bl. 603 (1796). A second case, Johnson v. Ma-
chielsne, 3 Camp. 44 (1811), was decided in accord with the Meyer case on
facts similar thereto.
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